Volume 99

Issue 4

Article 4

June 1997

Creditors of a Joint Tenant: Is There a Lien after Death
John W. Fisher II
West Virginia University College of Law, john.fisher@mail.wvu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
John W. Fisher II, Creditors of a Joint Tenant: Is There a Lien after Death, 99 W. Va. L. Rev. (1997).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol99/iss4/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @
WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Fisher: Creditors of a Joint Tenant: Is There a Lien after Death

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Volume 99

Summer 1997

Number 4

CREDITORS OF A JOINT TENANT:
IS THERE A LIEN AFTER DEATH?

John W. Fisher,I1"
I.

INTRODUCTION ..........................................

637

II.

COMMON LAW ...........................................

638

III.

EARLY WEST VIRGINIA LAW ...............................

642

IV.

TENANCY BY ENTIRETY: A FOOTNOTE WITHIN THE TEXT .........

649

V.

THE MORE RECENT CASES IN WEST VIRGINIA: THE SECOND
HALF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY ..........................

654

VI.

CREDITORS OF DECEASED JOINT TENANTS .....................

658

VII.

WHAT REAL ESTATE OF DECEDENTS IS AN ASSET FOR
PAYMENT OF DEBTS ......................................

664

VIII.

IS THERE A GENERAL RULE? .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

IX.

CONCLUSION ............................................

. 670

676

I. INTRODUCTION

The subject of cotenancies gives rise to some of the more interesting issues
of property law. As discussed infra, cotenancies were first recognized in the
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thirteenth century in feudal England and are still of significant importance today.I
Given the fact that cotenancies are created by a few words in a conveyance or
devise or under the law of intestate succession, the legal relationship between
cotenants is determined from the common law, court decisions and statutory
provisions and not from the language of the creating instrument? In spite of the
significant amount of property owned by cotenants and the corresponding attention
the subject area has received from our courts, there remain a number of unresolved
questions. One of these questions has been brought to my attention over the past
several years by several practicing attorneys?
The question is perhaps best understood by a simple example. Assume that
A and B own Blackacre as joint tenants with the right of survivorship; that C is a
creditor ofA (individually); that A dies survived by B and thatA 's estate is without
sufficient personal property to pay all ofA's debts, including the debt to C. Does
C have any "rights" against Blackacre owned by B following A's death pursuant to
the right of survivorship? Since there is no case or statute in West Virginia
specifically on point, an answer must be gleaned from the existing authority. In
discussing this issue, it is assumed that the survivorship was not created at a time
and for the purpose of defrauding creditors.

II. COMMON LAW
Because much of our modem property law has its roots in feudal England,
an understanding of the "common law" is often helpful in the search for answers to
today's questions. Inasmuch as the law of cotenancies began to take shape in
Bracton's days,4 it is appropriate to begin this discussion with the early common
law.
"Joint tenancies and tenancies in coparceny existed as early as the thirteenth

For an extensive discussion of early cotenancy, see Anne L. Spitzer, Joint Tenancy with Right of
Survivorship: A Legacy from Thirteenth Century England, 16 TEX. TECH L. REv. 629 (1985). An
empirical study of cotenancy in Iowa was published in 1966. N. William Hines, Real PropertyJoint
Tenancies: Law, Fact,and Fancy, 51 IOWA L. REv. 582 (1965-66).
2 A. JAMES CASNER & W. BARTON LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 254 (3d ed. 1984).

3 The question was first raised with me by Attorney Henry W. Morrow, of Charles Town
and since

then by several other attorneys.
4 2 AMERICANLAW OF PROPERTY

§ 6.1 (A. James Casner ed., 1952). Henry Bracton, who died in
1268, was one of the early English legal scholars. I EARL Jowirr & CLIFFORD WALSH, JOWITT'S
DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW 246 (John Burke ed., 2d ed. 1977).
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century.... Coparceners had undivided interests in the property which they...
acquired as female heirs of the prior owner because [there were] no male heirs of
equal degree" 5 who survived the owner's death.6 Upon the owner's death, the estate
passed to the female heirs as undivided interest without survivorship! If there were
male heirs, the land passed to the eldest son, to the exclusion of younger sons, under
the principle of primogeniture, which had been brought to England and established
by the Normans.8
In the thirteenth century, the only forms of co-ownership were joint tenancy
and coparceny and every conveyance, as opposed to descent to female heirs, of a
freehold estate (fee, fee tail or life estate) created a joint tenancy.9 "The grantees
took as though they ... constituted one person, a fictitious unity .... The historical
explanation of this fiction [of a single unity] is not clear,"' ' but it was probably
related to the feudal relationship." It was in the lord's best interest that each
freehold "be a single feud continuing until the death of the survivor."' 2 Professor
Raleigh Colston Minor, addressing the reason for this common law preference,
explains that "joint tenancy was much favored for the feudal reason that it
prevented the division of the useful services, such as military or agricultural
services, or rent, and the multiplication of the merely honorary services, such as
fealty."'3 Since the joint tenants were seised as a fictitious unity, there was of
necessity "a community of interest which required that [the] individual interests [of

5 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 6.1.
6 Id.

7Id.
8 1 id. § 2.1.
9 2 id. § 6.1.
10 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 6.1.

11 Id.
12 Id.
13 2 FREDERICK D. L.

G. RIBBLE, MINOR ON REAL PROPERTY § 838 (2d ed. 1928).
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the joint tenants] be equal in all respects."' 4
This community of identical interest evolved into the four unities which
were recognized as essential to joint tenancy, i.e., time, title, interest, and
possession.' These four unities express the basic idea that joint tenants "hold as
a unity with a community of interest between them, since if they take as one they
must take at the same time, by the same deed or feoffment, and must have interests
which are identical."' 6
It should be noted that the right of survivorship in the joint tenancy "is not
considered to be a type of future interest."' 7 As noted above, at common law the
joint tenancy was considered as a single entity "made up of the cotenants
collectively," and that entity continued "so long as any of the joint tenants
survive[d]. . . . When the first joint tenant dies, his individual right to share
possession and enjoyment ceases.... His heirs or devisees take nothing because the
individual cotenant has no estate of inheritance to pass on to them .... The deceased
tenant's estate is extinguished [upon] his death [and] the estate continues in the
survivor or survivors."' 8 Of course, the last survivor "owns the whole estate...

14 2 AIERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 6. 1.
15 Id.
16

Id. Commentators have explained that:

The essence of ajoint tenancy was the existence of a single estate in the unit, not
separate interests in the individual tenants. The requirement of the four unities
necessarily arose as a result of the basic concept rather than as prerequisites to the
creation of the estate. Unity of time meant that the interests of all tenants must
vest at the same time .... Unity of title meant that all must acquire title by the
same deed or will or by ajoint adverse possession. Unity of interest meant that
the joint tenants must have identical interests both as to the share of the common
property and as to the period of duration of the interest of each. One could not
take as a life tenant and the other in fee or in fee tail; one could not have a onefourth interest and the other three-fourths. Unity of possession meant that all of
the joint tenants had a common right to possess and enjoy the property. The unity
of possession was not peculiar to joint tenancies. All co-owners, whether joint
tenants, tenants in common, or coparceners, had a common right to share, possess,
and enjoy the property.
Id. (citations omitted).
17 Id.

18 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 6. 1.
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because he [or she] no longer shares the estate with his [or her] former cotenants."' 9
"Early in the fourteenth century it was decided that whenever one of [these
four unities was not present when the interest was created] or whenever one of the
unities was severed after the joint [tenancy] was established, a tenancy in common
would result," in which each tenant owned "an undivided, inheritable share, free
from ... survivorship."2' The only unity necessary for a tenancy in common is the
unity of possession."1
The distinction between the undivided, inheritable share of a tenancy in
common and the single entity concept ofjoint tenancy was significant not only to
the cotenants and their heirs, but also affected third parties such as creditors. "The
moiety of a tenant in common, except for the undivided possession, is a separate
legal title, and passes on the death of the tenant to his heirs, subject to dower or
curtesy." As a separate legal title, a tenant in common's interest is subject to the
cotenants' "debts" the same as any other asset 3 However, in order for a creditor
of ajoint tenant to "go after" the joint tenant's interest in the land, the creditor must,
in effect, sever the survivorship by destroying one of the four unities24 By
destroying the four unities, the joint interest is "converted" into a tenancy in
common." Also, it was generally recognized that the recovery of a judgment,
without the execution thereon, did not sever survivorship. 6 Lord Coke, in

19 Id. Powell expresses this same concept as follows:

Survivorship is an essential feature of ajoint tenancy. This means that
the joint tenant who survives the other cotenants takes the entire estate; the estates
of deceased joint tenants have no interest. Theoretically the survivor's interest
attaches by means of the original conveyance, not by transfer from the decedent.
Characteristicsof Joint Tenancy, 7 Powell on Real Prop. (MB) 617[3] (Nov. 1992) (citations
omitted).
20 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 6.2.
21 Id.
22 Id. § 6.5.
23 Id.
24

Id. § 6.2.

25 Id.
26 3 id. § 14.17.
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discussing Littleton's work said:
So it is if one joint-tenant acknowledge a recognizance or
a statute, or suffereth a judgment in an action of debt, &c. and
dieth before execution had, it shall not be executed afterwards.
But if execution be sued in the life of the conusor, it shall bind the
survivor. And it is further implied, that both in the case of the
charge, and of the recognizance, statute, and judgment, if he that
chargeth, &c. survive, it is good for ever."
Professor William Draper Lewis in a footnote to Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Laws of England explains the reason for this principle as
follows:
In consequence of the right of survivorship among joint-tenants, all
charges made by a joint-tenant on the estate determine by his
death, and do not affect the survivor; for it is a maxim of law that
jus accrescendiprefertur oneribus [The right of survivorship is
preferred to incumbrances]. I Inst. 185, a. Litt. sec. 286. But if the
grantor of the charge survives, of course, it is good. Co. Litt. 184,
b. So, if one joint-tenant suffers ajudgment in an action of debt to
be entered up against him, and dies before execution had, it will
not be executed afterwards; but if execution be sued in the life of
the cognizor, it will bind the survivor. Lord Abegavenny's case,
6 Rep. 79. I Inst. 184, a.28
"Afortiori,no part of the land can be reached by the non-judgment creditor of a
deceased joint tenant. These holdings mean that there is usually a post-mortem
'
exemption from the debts of the deceased joint tenant."29
III. EARLY WEST VIRGINIA LAW

There is surprisingly little early case law in West Virginia discussing the
27 1 SIR EDWARD COKE, SYSTEMATIC ARRANGEMENT OF LORD COKE'S FIRST INSTITUTE OF TiE LAWS

OF ENGLAND 582 (photo. reprint 1986) (1836) (citation omitted).
28 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 650

n.26 (William D. Lewis

ed., Rees Welsh & Co. 1902) (1765) (alteration in original).
29 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 14.17 (citations omitted).
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incidents of the ownership of real property as joint tenants. It is fair to assume that
this scarcity of cases reflects the fact that the common law incident of cotenancy
was accepted as the "law," and challenges to the common law concepts were simply
not pursued, at least not in the appellate court in our state.3' The major exception
to adherence to the concepts of the common law involves the "presumption" of the
type of estate created when property was conveyed or devised to more than one
person. At common law, a joint tenancy was created by a devise or conveyance
inter vivos when the estate was granted or devised "to a plurality of persons,
without adding any restrictive, exclusive, or explanatory words."3' Therefore, at
common law, it was presumed that a conveyance to two or more individuals created
ajoint tenancy.32 Minor explains the reason for this common law preference and
the retreat from it as follows:
[J]oint tenancy was much favored for the feudal reason that it
prevented the division of the useful services, such as military or
agricultural services, or rent, and the multiplicationof the merely
honoraryservices, such asfealty. But for more than a century past
the courts have laid hold of every available expression to construe
estates given to a plurality of tenants as tenancies in common. And
although this innovation began in equity, and in reference to wills,
yet it has long prevailed in the courts of common law as well, and
the doctrine extends to deeds as uniformly as to wills. Hence, such
expressions as "equally to be divided," "share and share alike,"

30 See 2 JOHN B. MINOR, INSTITUTES OF COMMON AND STATUTE LAW 4-5 (2d ed. rev. & corrected

1877); 2 RIBBLE, supra note 13, § 844. Minor and Ribble, two early commentators on the law in
Virginia and West Virginia, relied upon Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland and Lord
Coke's analysis of Littleton in discussing the law in the Virginias. See 2 MINOR, supra.
31 2 RIBBLE, supra note 13, § 838. Blackstone stated the rule as follows:

The creationof an estate in joint-tenancy depends on the wording of the deed or
devise by which the tenants claim title; for this estate can only arise by purchase
or grant, that is, by the act of the parties, and never by the mere act of law. Now,
if an estate be given to a plurality of persons, without adding any restrictive,
exclusive, or explanatory words, as if an estate be granted to A. and B. and their
heirs, this makes them immediately joint-tenants in fee of the lands. For the law
interprets the grant so as to make all parts of it take effect, which can only be done
by creating an equal estate in them both. As, therefore, the grantor has thus united
their names, the law gives them a thorough union in all other respects.
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 215 (John L. Wendell ed., Harper
& Bros. 1872) (1765).
32 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 6. 1.
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"respectively between and amongst them," will, according to this
modem construction, convert into a tenancy in common, what
would once have been ajoint tenancy."33
In Virginia, the "reversal" of the common law presumption that a
conveyance to two or more persons created ajoint tenancy culminated in statutory
provisions. In 1849, Virginia adopted two statutes. The first provided:
When any joint tenant shall die, whether the estate be real
or personal, or whether partition could have been compelled or not,
his part shall descend to his heirs, or pass by devise, or go to his
personal representative, subject to debts, curtesy, dower or
distribution, as if he had been a tenant in common. And if
hereafter an estate of inheritance be conveyed or devised to a
husband and his wife, one moiety of such estate shall, on the death
of either, descend to his or her heirs, subject to debts, curtesy or
dower, as the case may be.34
The second Virginia statute provided that:
The preceding section shall not apply to any estate which
joint tenants have as executors or trustees, nor to an estate
conveyed or devised to persons in their own right, when it
manifestly appears from the tenor of the instrument that it was
intended the part of one dying should then belong to the others.
Neither shall it affect the mode of proceeding on any joint
judgment or decree in favour of, or on any contract with, two or
more, one of whom dies.35
Minor explained the effect of these statutory provisions as follows:
Thejus accrescendi [the right of survivorship] is entirely
abolished, as between joint tenants in Virginia, save only in three
cases, namely: (1) Joint trustees; (2) Joint executors; and (3)

33 2 RIBBLE, supra note 13,
34 VA. CODE

§ 838 (citations omitted).

§ 33-18 (1849) (current version at VA. CODEANN. § 55-20 (Michie 1950)).

35 VA. CODE § 33-19 (1849) (current version at VA. CODEANN.
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Where it appears from the tenor of the instrument that it was
intended the part of one dying should then belong to the others.
The effect of this statute is by no means to abolish joint
tenancies. On the contrary, they exist in Virginia, with all their
legal attributes, except only that no survivorship takes place save
in the three cases above mentioned.36
When West Virginia became a state it included these Virginia statutes as a part of
our first code.37
The effect of these statutes was judicially recognized by the court in
DeLong v. Farmers Building & Loan Ass'nS as reversing the common law
presumption.39 In DeLong, the court observed:
that as a result of legislation abrogating the common law doctrine
of survivorship as an element of joint tenancy, the common law
rule favoring joint tenancy has been superseded and it is now
presumed that the tenancy in question is a tenancy in common
instead of a joint tenancy unless a contrary intention to create a

36 2

RIBBLE, supra note

13, § 848 (alteration added) (citations omitted).

37 W. VA. CODE §§ 71-18 to -19 (1870) (current version at W. VA. CODE §§ 36-1-19
to -20 (1985).

The original code stated that:
When any joint tenant shall die, whether the estate be real or personal,
or whether partition could have been compelled or not, his part shall descend to
his heirs, or pass by devise, or go to his personal representative, subject to debts,'
curtesy, dower, or distribution, as if he had been a tenant in common. And if
hereafter an estate of inheritance be conveyed or devised to a husband and his
wife, one moiety of such estate shall, on the death of either, descend to his or her
heirs, subject to debts, curtesy, or dower, as the case may be.
W. VA. CODE § 71-18. The code also provided:
The preceding section shall not apply to any estate which joint tenants
have as executors or trustees, nor to an estate conveyed or devised to persons in
their own right, when it manifestly appears from the tenor of the instrument that
it was intended that the part of the one dying should then belong to the others.
Neither shall it affect the mode of proceeding on any joint judgment or decree in
favor of, or on any contract with, two or more, one of whom dies.
W. VA. CODE § 71-19.
38 137 S.E.2d II (W. Va. 1964).
39 Id. at 17.
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joint tenancy sufficiently appears. 4°
While the code sections were cited in several early cases, 4' it was not until
1921 that a "meaningful" discussion of these statutes appeared in a reported case.
In Neal v. Hamilton Co.,42 the court was asked to construe a provision in the
testator's will which stated that "'[i]n case of the death of either of my sons above
named [without issue] I will and bequeath that the remaining son living shall have
and hold in his own right the whole of the above named bounded two tracts of
land."' 43 In order to construe the will, the court had to decide whether the sons took
as joint tenants or as tenants in common.44 After quoting the applicable statutes, the
court concluded the testator had sufficiently expressed his intention to create
survivorship; therefore, his sons took as joint tenants.45

40

Id. The DeLong case involved a deposit in a building and loan association. Id. Any question as

to whether the general statement quoted above applied to the subject statutes is resolved later in the
opinion when the court stated:
Under the provision of Section 19, Article 1, Chapter 36, Code 193 1,
which, except in certain instances specified in Section 20, abrogates the element
of survivorship in ajoint tenancy in real and personal property, a tenancy in such
property is presumed to be a tenancy in common unless it appears from the
contract or the applicable statute that a joint tenancy is intended.
Id.
41

See Bank of Greenbrier v. Effingham, 41 S.E. 143 (W. Va. 1902); Lazier v. Lazier, 14 S.E. 148 (W.

Va. 1891).
42

73 S.E. 971 (W. Va. 1912).

43

Id. at 972 (alteration added).

44 Id.
45

Id. at 975. The court reasoned that:
Lastly, are the plain provisions of the will, and the estate or estates
created thereby, materially controlled or affected, or prejudiced, by the provisions
of sections 8, 18 and 19 of chapter 71, Code 1906? The pertinent provisions of
these sections are: "8. Where any real estate is * * * devised * * * to any person
without any words of limitation, such devise * ** shall be construed to pass the
fee simple * * * unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will." "18. When
any joint tenant shall die * * * his part (of real estate) shall descend to his heirs or
pass by devise, * * * subject to debts, curtesy, dower, * * * as if he had been a
tenant in common." "19. The preceding section shall not apply * * * to an estate
conveyed or devised to persons in their own right, when it manifestly appears from
the tenor of the instrument that it was intended that the part of the one dying
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After concluding that the testator had sufficiently expressed his intention
to create survivorship between his sons,46 the court affirmed that the joint tenancy
created pursuant to the statute had the same attributes as the joint tenancy that
existed at common law.47 The court stated:
True in this State as in Virginia the right of survivorship,
at common law, is abolished by statute, but this is not so, if the
deed, or as here, the will, expressly limits the estate granted or
devised to the survivor. When so limited the grantees or devisees
take joint estates only, subject to all the limitations attaching to
such estates as at common law. 2 Minor's Inst. 410. Thus dower
would not attach in favor of the widow of the one dying, for at

should then belong to the others."
Though the devise of the fourth paragraph of the will is to the two sons
without words of limitation, it is insisted, that the provisions of said section 8
carried the fee simple to the sons, subject to the life estate, and though a joint
tenancy at common law was thereby created, the estate of the deceased son, upon
his death, by virtue of said section 18, passed to the plaintiff, his heir, "as if he had
been a tenant in common." But section 8 says, unless a contrary intention shall
appear by the will; and section 19 says, "the preceding section shall not apply *
* * to an estate conveyed or devised to persons in their own right, when it
manifestly appears from the tenor of the instrument that it was intended that the
part of the one dying should then belong to the others." Does not a contrary
intention appear in the sixth paragraph of the will? And though survivorship at
common law be abolished by said section 18, converting a joint tenancy into a
tenancy in common, it is only by virtue of that section; and section 19 dissolves
that effect, "when it manifestly appears from the tenor of the instrument that it was
intended that the part of the one dying should then belong to the others." How
could a testator have more clearly manifested his intention that the "part of the one
dying should then belong to the others," than by saying as he did in the sixth
paragraph of his will, that "the remaining son living shall have and hold in his
own right the whole of the above named bounded two tracts of land"? The words
of the devise in the fourth paragraph must be placed in juxtaposition to these plain
and positive words of the sixth paragraph. The provisions of the statute cannot be
applied or otherwise enforced, except by due regard to both provisions of the will.
Is there anything then in the nature, character or quality of the estate
which the two sons took on the death of the testator, to let in the plaintiff by
inheritance, to succeed to the share which his father might have taken, and
intercepting the operation of the sixth paragraph, in favor of the surviving son?
We think not.
Id.
46 Neal, 73 S.E. at 972.
47 Id. at 975-76.
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common law to give dower the husband must not be seized as a
joint tenant, in consequence of survivorship. 2 Minor Inst. 121.
And of course nothing would at his death go by inheritance to his
heirs.48
Another of the earlier cases of interest is Carterv. Carter.49 In Carter,the
plaintiff, the father of a deceased joint tenant, sought partition of the real estate as
his son's sole heir.5" The defendant was the plaintiff's daughter-in-law.5 ' The
subject real estate had been owned (solely) by the plaintiff's son (defendant's
husband), who conveyed it to a trustee (straw party) for the purpose of reconveying
it to him and his wife as joint tenants with the right of survivorship 2 The plaintiff
attacked the conveyance from the trustee to his son and daughter-in-law by arguing
that the conveyance to the trustee did not authorize the trustees to reconvey the
property to the grantors as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, i.e., the
trustee could not impose any condition or limitation except those authorized in the
deed to the trustee.5 3 The court construed two deeds together (the deed from the
son/husband to the trustee and the deed from the trustee to the husband (son) and
wife and held the trustee had the authority to create survivorship."
The conveyance of real property to a straw party for the purpose of
reconveying and creating the four unities necessary for a joint tenancy became
48

Id.

49

104 S.E. 558 (W. Va. 1920).

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Id.

Carter, 104 S.E. at 558. The court explained:
here we have a deed from the beneficiaries of the trust, with a recital implying an
intention to create a joint tenancy in the property, which at common law would
have created in them the right of survivorship. In an effort to effectuate their
purposes, and manifestly with reference to the provisions of section 19 of said
chapter 71 (sec. 3757), we must say, in construing the two deeds together, that
they procured Perry, their trustee, to grant the property to them in such a way as
to give right of survivorship in them.
Id. at 558.
54
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common practice in West Virginia.55 Even after the adoption of chapter 36, article
1, section 20a of the West Virginia Code,5 6 the conveyance of real property to a
straw party for the purpose of reconveying the right of survivorship is still preferred
by some attorneys.
IV. TENANCY BY ENTIRETY: A FOOTNOTE WITHIN THE TEXT

One of the interesting aspects of the adoption of the statutes reversing the
common law presumption ofjoint tenancy when a conveyance was to two or more
individuals, is the statute's effect on tenancy by entirety. Ribble has explained that:
The tenancy by entireties is governed by much the same
principles that control joint tenancy. Indeed, in one aspect, it may
be said to be a joint tenancy, modified by the common law
principle that the husband and wife are but one person, for this
tenancy can exist only where the persons to whom the property is
given are husband and wife at the time of the gift, it not being
created by a conveyance or devise to persons in joint tenancy who
afterwards marry."
At common law, an estate in entirety differed from joint tenancy in that tenants in
entirety had no individual interest that they could convey so as to break the unities
and defeat survivorship.5 8 At common law, the husband and wife were a unity, and
the husband had complete custody, control, and right to use the property held by the

55 Id.
56 This provision eliminated need for straw party in creating joint tenancy with right of survivorship.

See W. VA. CODE § 36-1-20a (1985). The statute states:
Any conveyance or transfer of property, or any interest therein, creating
a joint tenancy with right of survivorship together with the person or persons
conveying or transferring such property, executed by such person or persons to or
in favor of another shall be valid to the same extent as a similar transfer or
conveyance from a third party or by a straw party deed.
Id.
57 2 RIBBLE, supra note 13,

§ 853.

58 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 6.6.
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unity during the joint lives of him and his wife.5 9
The question of whether West Virginia recognized tenancy by entirety was
before the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in McNeeley v. South Penn
Oil Co." For those interested in the evolution of real property law, the McNeeley
case provides interesting reading. While the pivotal issue involved whether the
cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations, in order to answer that
question the court had to decide whether West Virginia still recognized the estate
of tenancy by entirety.6 The case also discussed the husband's right to curtesy.62
After explaining that the decided weight of authority in our sister states had held
that the married woman's act had not abolished estates by the entirety, that the West
Virginia statute was based on the New York Act, and after noting that New York
had held its act had not abolished estates by the entirety, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia held that tenancy by entirety had been abolished in West
Virginia.63 The court reasoned that chapter 71, section 8 of the West Virginia

59 Id.
60 44

S.E. 508 (W. Va. 1903).

61 Id.

62

Id. Tenancy by curtesy was abolished in West Virginia in 1931. Act of Apr. 4, 1930, 1929-1930

W. Va. Acts Extraord. Sess. 9 (version codified at W. VA. CODE §§ 43-1-18) (effective Jan. 1, 193 1)
(repealed 1992). Also, in 1931 the husband was given the same statutory dower rights as the wife. Act
of Apr. 4, 1930, 1929-1930 W. Va. Acts Extraord. Sess. 9 (version codified at W. VA. CODE §§ 43-11) (effective Jan. 1, 1931) (amended 1992). For a discussion of curtesy in West Virginia prior to its
abolition, see Note, Tenant By Curtesy -Acts 1921 - Construction,29 W. VA. L. Q. & B. 199 (photo.
reprint 1963) (1922-1923).
63

McNeeley, 44 S.E. at 512.
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1651

Code 4 combined with the married woman's act abolished tenancy by the entirety-5
Just seven years after the decision in McNeeley, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia held that a conveyance "'unto the said Tollison Stover
and Martha Jane his wife to be held by them as a homestead for themselves, and
after them to their heirs"' created an estate by entirety for life only 6 In the relevant
portion of the opinion, the court explained:
Upon the death of Martha Jane Stover, her heirs immediately came
into being, and the title to one moiety of the estate in remainder
immediately became vested in them. Their enjoyment of the
possession, however, was deferred until the death of Tollison
Stover, because the life estate to him and his wife was an estate by
entireties, and, being a life estate only, it was subject to the jus
accrescendi.
Section 18, c. 71, Code 1906, abolishing the
common-law right of survivorship, does not apply to a life estate
by entireties. It applies only to estates of inheritance. 7

64 W. VA. CODE § 71-8 (1899) (current version at W. VA. CODE § 36-1-19 (1985)). The version
of
the code in effect in 1903 at the time of the McNeeley case stated:
Where any real estate is conveyed, devised, or granted to any person
without any words of limitation, such devise, conveyance, or grant shall be
construed to pass the fee simple or the whole estate or interest which the testator
or grantor had power to dispose of in such real estate, unless a contrary intention
shall appear by the will, conveyance, or grant.
Id.
65 McNeeley, 44 S.E. at 512-13. Justice Brannon explained:
A reason exists, from this, in this state, for saying that estates by entirety have
ceased since the married woman's act, that does not exist in other states.
Survivorship has perished under the Code of 1849. The right of the husband to
control and take the profits of and convey for his life the interest of the wife in
entirety estates has been taken away by the separate estate act. What is left of an
estate by entirety? Is its indivisibility or impartibility still left? I think not, as I
think the statute of partition applies to it. From these considerations, I conclude
that we cannot say that the statute of limitations does not apply because Higgins
and wife had an estate by entirety, since I think that, by the joint operation of the
act abolishing survivorship between husband and wife and the separate estate act,
Higgins and wife held the land as joint tenants, not an estate by entirety. But
Higgins had curtesy after his wife's death.
Id.
66 Irvin v. Stover, 67 S.E. 1119, 1120 (W. Va. 1910).
67 Id. at 1122.
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While the court did not further explain its holding, it seems apparent that
the court was interpreting the last sentence of section 18, which stated that "[a]nd
if hereafter an estate of inheritancebe conveyed or devised to a husband and his
wife, one moiety of such estate shall, on the death of either, descend to his or her
heirs, subject to debts, curtesy or dower, as the case may be." ' 8 To the extent there
may have been uncertainty as to the status of tenancy by entirety in West Virginia,69
the question was answered in Wartenburg v. Wartenburg.0 In Wartenburg,
property had been conveyed to a husband and wife as "joint tenants."'" The
husband sought to partition the land conveyed to him and his wife as "joint
tenants"; the circuit court denied partition, holding that because the parties took an
estate by entireties, it was not subject to partition.72
After briefly tracing the legislative history of the statutory provisions first
adopted in Virginia in 1849 and incorporated into the laws of West Virginia in the
code of 1868 as chapter 71, section 18 of the West Virginia Code, and noting that
this section had been rewritten in the 1931 revision of our code,73 the court stated
"[t]he precise question involved in the instant case was discussed at length and, we
think, decided, in McNeeley v. South Penn Oil Co., 52 W.Va. 616, 44 S.E. 508, 62

68

W. VA. CODE ch. 71, § 3037 (1906) (current version at W. VA. CODE § 36-1-19 (1985))

(corresponding to W. VA. CODE ch. 71, § 18 (1899)) (emphasis added).
69

Wartenburg v. Wartenburg, 100 S.E.2d 562, 565 (W. Va. 1957).

70

Id.

71 Id. at 563. The property had been conveyed to the husband and wife in two deeds: one deed

provided it was to the parties (husband and wife) "'for and during their natural lives as joint tenants
with remainder in fee to the survivor."' Id. at 563. The second deed read "'as joint tenants with the
right of survivorship.' Id. As to the difference in the wording used in the two deeds the court stated
that "[n]o contention is made, and we perceive no presently material difference or effect, as to the
meaning of the language used in the respective deeds." Wartenburg, 100 S.E.2d at 563.
72

Id.

73 The court noted that "the Revisers of the 1931 Code appended a note to the section, saying: 'This

section is a shorter and more direct statement but having the same effect as § 18, c. 71, Code 1923."'
Id. at 564. The new version of this section read:
When any joint tenant or tenant by the entireties of an interest in real or
personal property, whether such interest be a present interest, or by way of
reversion or remainder or other future interest, shall die, his share shall descent or
be disposed of as if he had been a tenant in common.
W. VA. CODE § 36-1-19 (1931) (setting forth statute in same language as is currently in effect).
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L.R.A. 562.2"

The court then explained:

In addition to the change in the language contained in
Section 18 of Chapter 71 of the 1868 Code by the adoption of the
1931 Code, it may be helpful to point out that important and
pertinent amendments and additions have been made to the
statutory provisions relating to'the rights of married women since
the decision of McNeeley v. South Penn Oil Co., supra. For
example, Section 13 of Article-3-f Chapter 48 first became a part
of our statutory law with the adoption of the 1931 Code. The
section reads: "Any property to which a married woman is
entitled, either at law or in equity, may not be subjected to any
restraints upon alienation or other restrictions that may not
lawfully be placed upon the property of persons not married."
Though we assume the holding in McNeeley v. South Penn Oil
Company, supra, to be erroneous, how can we now say that the
interest of a married woman in real estate is not susceptible of
partition, in view of such changes in the married woman's statutes,
while the same interest, if owned by a woman "not married", [sic]
would be susceptible of partition?
In considering the effect of the several pertinent statutory
provisions, we have not overlooked Code, 36-1-20, relating to the
rights of survivorship. We think, however, that section cannot be
given controlling effect as to the question involved. The rights of
survivorship do not depend on the continued existence of common
law estates by entireties. Such estates were created and existed at
common law only by virtue of a fiction, a fiction not recognized in
this State, that a husband and wife constitute a unity, and that,
therefore, separate and distinct interests in property could not be
created by a conveyance to them.
The effect of the statutes mentioned, especially Code, 361-19, we believe, completely abolishes common law estates by
entireties. This being true, the deeds mentioned created joint
tenancies in the grantees, vesting in each an undivided one half
interest in the properties conveyed, subject to the survivorship
rights of each other. Partition of the real estate conveyed by the

74 Wartenburg, 100 S.E.2d at 564 (emphasis added).
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deeds, therefore, is compellable.75

V. THE MORE RECENT CASES IN WEST VIRGINIA:
THE SECOND HALF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

A number of the joint tenancy cases in the second half of this century have
involved "joint accounts" in financial institutions. The first of these cases was Lett
v. Twentieth Street Bank,76 which was followed a decade later by DeLong v.
FarmersBuilding and Loan Ass "n. In the years since the Lett and DeLong cases,
there have been a number of other joint account cases.78
One of the more interesting of the joint tenancy cases in West Virginia is
State ex rel. Miller v. Sencindiver.7 9

The question in State ex rel. Miller v.

Sencindiver was whether a wife who killed her husband should be permitted to
claim the entire ownership of the real estate that had been conveyed to her and her
husband as joint tenant with the right of survivorship." While it is submitted the
court erred in rejecting the constructive trust approach, which has been used in
some sister jurisdictions to prevent the wrongdoer from profiting from his or her

75 Id. at 565. A number of states still recognize tenancy by entirety. Sawada v. Endo,
561 P.2d 1291
(Haw. 1977); Oval A. Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 24 (1951). In those states, the
rights of ajudgment creditor of only one of the tenants have been decided in different ways. For a very
good discussion of the status of tenancy by the entirety, see Sawada, 561 P.2d at 1294-95. The
Sawada decision provides both a summary and an update of Oval A. Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties,
25 TEMP. L.Q. 24 (1951-52). Sawada,561 P.2d at 1294-95.
76

77 S.E.2d 813 (W. Va. 1953).

77 137 S.E.2d 11 (W. Va. 1964).

78 See John W. Fisher, II, Joint Tenancy in West Virginia: A ProgressiveCourt Looks at Traditional
PropertyRights, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 267,277 (1989); Dana F. Eddy, Issues of Ownership,Control, and
Entitlement: Toward a More PragmaticAnalysis of the Law GoverningJoint Deposit Accounts in West
Virginia, 97 W. VA. L. REv. 287 (1995). A discussion of the joint account decision is beyond the
scope of this article, but these cases and the subject of"joint accounts" have been discussed in recent
issues of the West Virginia Law Review. See id.; Fisher, supra.
79 275 S.E.2d 10 (W. Va. 1980).
80

Id.
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own wrongful act,"' several statements by the court in Miller are relevant to the
present discussion. First the Miller court recognized that "[t]he Taylors' [the slayer
and the victims'] rights were established by their deed and did not involve descent
or inheritance. 8 2
After briefly discussing the holdings in other jurisdictions on the question
of the slayer's right to property owned jointly with the victim, the court then
rejected the reasoning of the courts of our sister states and held the slayer was
entitled to the entire joint estate in the land. 3 The court explained its reasoning as
follows:
We decline to decide that ajoint tenancy with survivorship
created by prior conveyance is vested property that may be
divested by the killing of one's cotenant. We decline because by
the Legislature's modifications of the common law concerning
joint tenancies, tenancies by the entireties, and cotenancies which
allow creation by the parties of the incident of survivorship when
intention to do so has been made clearly evident in a titling
document, the Legislature has in effect preempted the matter.8 4
If State ex rel. Miller v. Sencindiver is considered one of more enigmatic

81 For criticism of the State ex rel. Miller v. Sencindiver decision, see Fisher, supra note 78, at 294.
82

State ex rel. Miller, 275 S.E.2d at 13. Following citations from other jurisdictions for this

proposition, the court quotes United Trust Co. as follows:
The right to succeed to property as a surviving joint tenant is another
field and subject matter pre-empted by the legislature.... By these statutes the
legislature has provided for the creation and termination of estates in joint tenancy
and the requirements necessary for succeeding to such property by right of
survivorship. The statutes were applied in In re Estate of Foster, 182 Kan. 315,
320 P.2d 855, and it was said that in none of them has the legislature seen fit to
limit or restrict the right of a surviving joint tenant to succeed to the property
because of criminal conduct on his part, and it was held:
"The distinctive characteristic of joint tenancy is survivorship, and a
surviving joint tenant of real property does not take as a new acquisition under the
laws of descent and distribution, but under the conveyance by which the joint
tenancy was created, his estate merely being freed from participation of the other."
Id. (quoting United Trust Co. v. Pyke, 427 P.2d 67, 76 (Kan. 1967)).
83

Idat 13-14.

84 Id. at 14 (citing DeLong v. Farmers Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 137 S.E.2d 11, 17 (W. Va. 1964)).
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85 should be
decisions on joint tenancy in West Virginia, then Herringv. Carroll
described as one of the more lucid. The Herringdecision provides the pedological
link between the common law doctrine and "modern," i.e., post statutory,
cotenancies.
In Herring,Mr. and Mrs. Herring were the owners of land conveyed to
them as joint tenants with the right of survivorship.86 Mrs. Herring conveyed "'her
right, title and interest"' in the survivorship property to her son by a previous
marriage." Mr. Herring sought to nullify the deed from Mrs. Herring to her son.!
Therefore, the issue placed squarely before the court was whether "one joint tenant
can convey all of his right, title and interest in real property and, thereby, destroy
the other joint tenant's right of survivorship, thus, in effect creating a tenancy in
common." 9 The answer at common law was clearly that the conveyance by Mrs.
Herring "severed" or ended the joint tenancy.9" Because "[t]he doctrine of
survivorship is the grand incident of joint estates, which more than any other
distinguishes them from the other instances of estates held in common,' " the
92
court's decision in Herringwould answer the question of what effect the statutes
reversing the common law presumption ofjoint tenancy had upon the common law
concepts of cotenancy. The Herringv. Carrollopinion, written by Justice Miller,

85 300 S.E.2d 629 (W. Va. 1983).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 631.
88 Id at 630-31.
89 Id. at 630.
90 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4,

§ 6.2. Commentators have stated that:
Where there are only two joint tenants, the breaking of the unities ends
the joint tenancy, the purchaser of the share conveyed and the remaining cotenant
becoming tenants in common of equal shares. If there are more than two
cotenants, the purchaser becomes tenant in common of the share conveyed, and
the joint tenancy continues as to the remaining joint tenants, subject to
survivorship as between themselves, but excluding the share conveyed which
passes by will or inheritance on the death of the grantee of that share.

Id.
91 2 RIBBLE, supra note 13,
92 W. VA. CODE

§ 847.

§§ 36-1-19 to -20 (1985) (setting forth language effective in 1983).
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is well-written and well-reasoned and, therefore, provides the reader with
considerable insight into the nature ofjoint tenancy created pursuant to chapter 36,
article 1, section 20 of the West Virginia Code.
One of the important aspects of the Herringcase is that it "corrects" the
misconception or misstatement in the State ex rel. Miller case, quoted supra,that
suggests that "modem" joint tenancies created by the legislature have superseded
the common law joint tenancies.
The court ended its discussion by declaring that "[flor the foregoing
reasons, we conclude that W. Va. Code, 36-1-19 and 20, do not abolish the common
law requirement of the four unities in ajoint tenancy."94
The Herringdecision was followed by Harrisv. Crowder95 and Vincent v.
Gustke.96 In both the Harrisand Vincent cases, the issue was what rights, if any,
does a creditor of one spouse have relating to the marital home owned by the
93 See State ex rel.Miller v. Sencindiver, 275 S.E.2d 10, 14 (W. Va. 1980) (citing DeLong v. Farmers
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 137 S.E.2d 11, 17 (W. Va. 1964)). After quoting the last sentence from the above
quote from State ex rel.Miller, the court in Herringexplained the relevance of the common law's four
unities to the understanding of"modem"joint tenancy. Herring,300 S.E.2d at 633-64. The Herring
court elucidated as follows:
Moreover, our cases which discuss W. Va. Code, 36-1-19 and 20, have
never suggested that these statutes have abolished the common law four unities
that are essential to ajoint tenancy. In Neal v. Hamilton Company, 70 W. Va. at
262, 73 S.E. at 975, this statement was made:
True in this State as in Virginia the right of survivorship, at
common law, is abolished by statute, but this is not so, if the
deed, or as here, the will, expressly limits the estate granted
or devised to the survivor. When so limited the grantees or
devisees take joint estates only, subject to all the limitations
attachingto such estates as at common law. 2 Minor's Inst.
410 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, had the Legislature intended to abolish the four common
law unities for ajoint tenancy when it enacted W. Va. Code, 36-1-19 and 20, there
would have been no need for its enactment in 1974 ofW. Va. Code, 48-3-7a. This
statute authorizes a direct conveyance between husband and wife of an interest in
property with a right of survivorship. At common law, such a direct conveyance
could not create ajoint tenancy because the four unities requirement was lacking.
The grantor making the direct conveyance of an undivided interest did not hold
his title from the deed to his grantee but under the original deed to the grantor.
Id. (citations omitted).
94 Id. at 634.
95 322 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1984).
96

336 S.E.2d 33 (W. Va. 1985).
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husband and wife as joint tenants with the right of survivorship.97 While these two
decisions must be read together to understand the answer to that question, for
present purposes the discussion in Vincent v. Gustke is the relevant opinion. The
Vincent decision recognizes that a creditor of a joint tenant can obtain a judgment
against a joint tenant; the judgment creates a lien against the joint tenant's
property; the "judgment" lien creditor can "execute his lien against the debtor's
share of the property;" and, "[s]ale on execution of ajoint tenant's interest in joint
property is sufficient to operate as a severance of a joint tenancy."98 After the
judgment creditor's sale, "the creditor [the purchaser at the judgment creditor sale]
and the remaining joint tenant hold the property as tenants in common.' 9
VI. CREDITORS OF DECEASED JOINT TENANTS

As the court established in the Harris and Vincent cases, West Virginia
follows the common law in that the mere entry of a judgment does not sever the
right of survivorship.' 0 In order for severance of survivorship to occur, the
judgment debtors interest in the joint tenancy estate must be sold pursuant to a
judgment creditor suit.'
While severance is necessary to "destroy" the
survivorship, the question remains, can a creditor of one of the joint tenants, who
dies survived by his/her cotenants, assert any claim against the real estate held in
ajoint tenancy created pursuant to the West Virginia Code?0 2 The issue becomes
particularly important where the deceased joint tenant does not "leave" sufficient
personal property to pay his/her debts. 3 In considering this question, it is

97 See John W. Fisher, II, If Judgment CreditorsCannot Set Asunder a DebtorSpouse's Interest in

the MaritalHome, What Can They Do?, 97 W. VA. L. REv. 339 (1995).
98

Vincent, 336 S.E.2d at 35.

99 Id. at 35. The holding in Vincent as summarized above is consistent with the authorities. See 2
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 6.2.

100 See Vincent, 336 S.E.2d at 33; Harris v. Crowder, 322 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1984).
101 See W. VA. CODE § 38-3-9 (1985); Harris,322 S.E.2d at 861.
102 See W. VA. CODE
103

§§ 36-1-20, 20a (1985).

See generally 2 T. W. HARRISON,

HARRISON ON WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION FOR VIRGINIA AND

WEST VIRGINIA § 467 (George P. Smith, Jr. ed., 3d ed. 1986) (instructing that absent instructions in

a will, either expressed or implied, personal property is used first to pay debts of the decedent). The
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important to keep in mind that at common law the interest of the deceased joint
tenant was not considered as "passing" to the surviving joint tenant at death."° The
property interest in the joint tenancy was created at the time of the conveyance or
devise and the death of a joint tenant simply meant the joint tenant no longer
participated in the estate.10 5 The concept has been explained as follows:
The right of survivorship is not considered to be a type of
future interest. It is based on the concept that the estate is held by
a fictitious entity made up of the cotenants collectively and that the
entity continues so long as any of the joint tenants survive. When
the first joint tenant dies, his individual right to share possession
and enjoyment ceases. His heirs or devisees take nothing because
the individual cotenant has no estate of inheritance to pass on to
them. The deceased tenant's estate is extinguished on his death;
the estate continues in the survivor or survivors. The last survivor,
of course, owns the whole estate in severalty because he no longer
shares the estate with his former cotenants.
A joint tenancy arises only by purchase; that is, by deed or
will or by adverse possession. If the property descends to heirs
from an ancestor who died intestate, the heirs take as tenants in
common. 106
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has expressly followed the
common law in this respect. In State ex rel. Miller v. Sencindiver,"7 the court stated
that "[tihe Taylors' [the joint tenants'] rights were established by their deed and did

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has stated that:
Numerous cases decided by this court hold that the personal estate is the primary
fund for the payment of debts. It is an almost, if not quite, universal rule, both in
England and America. 4 Kent, Comm. 420. Except where by will the personal
estate is exempted from the payment of debts, and the real estate charged
therewith, resort can never be had to the real estate of a decedent for the payment
of his debts, unless the personal property is insufficient to pay them.
McConaughey v. Bennett's Ex'rs, 40 S.E. 540, 543 (W. Va. 1901).
104

2

AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note

4, § 6. 1.

105 Id.
106

2 id.§ 6.1; see also 2 RIBBLE, supra note 13, § 838 (footnotes omitted).

107 275 S.E.2d 10 (W. Va. 1980).
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not involve descent or inheritance."' ° Therefore, West Virginia follows the
common law concept that there is no "interest" which "passes" from the first joint
tenant who dies to his/her surviving joint tenant(s). Since the first joint tenant to
die has no inheritable interest in the real property,"' there would be no "asset" to
survive his/her death which creditors could "attach."
The court's language and analysis in Harris establishes that the joint
tenancy created in West Virginia pursuant to the statutory provision"' is
fundamentally the same as the joint tenancy estate which existed at common law.' 2
This is important because it is a basic tenet of law in West Virginia that the
common law3 is to be followed unless it has been changed by statute or is
"repugnant."". Since the court in Herringexpressly held that the four unities of the
common law are still applicable in West Virginia and resolved the case on the basis

108 Id. at 13. The court in State ex rel. Miller quotes with approval United Trust Co v. Pyke as
follows:
The distinctive characteristic ofjoint tenancy is survivorship, and a surviving joint
tenant of real property does not take as a new acquisition under the laws of descent
and distribution, but under the conveyance by which the joint tenancy was created,
his estate merely being freed from participation of the other.
Id. (quoting United Trust Co. v. Pyke, 427 P.2d 67, 76 (Kan. 1967)).
109 Id.

110 See 2

RIBBLE,

supra note 13, § 838.

III W. VA. CODE § 36-1-20 (1985).
112 See supra note 93.
113 W. VA. CONST. art. VIII,

§ 13. The West Virginia Constitution provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this article, such parts of the common
law, and of the laws of this State as are in force on the effective date of this article
and are not repugnant thereto, shall be and continue the law of this State until
altered or repealed by the legislature.
Id. The West Virginia Code provides that:
The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to the
principles of the constitution of this state, shall continue in force within the same,
except in those respects wherein it was altered by the general assembly of Virginia
before the twentieth day of June, eighteen hundred and sixty-three, or has been,
or shall be, altered by the Legislature of this state.
W. VA. CODE § 2-1-1 (1994); see ROBERT M. BASTRESS, THE WEST VIRGINIA STATE CONSTITUTION:
A REFERENCE GUIDE 222 (1995).
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of common law concepts and analysis,"' it is fair to assume that there is nothing
inherently repugnant in the common law concept ofjoint tenancy. Therefore, if the
common law is not to be followed in this instance, it would be because it has been
changed by statute. Since there is no statute in West Virginia which specifically
addresses the question of a creditor's rights to pursue a deceased joint tenant's
interest in land "passing" to his/her surviving joint tenant(s), the question is whether
some related statute may be sufficient to change the common law. It is submitted
that the two statutes which most probably raise the question are chapter 38, article
3, section 6 of the West6 Virginia Code"' and chapter 44, article 8, section 3 of the
West Virginia Code."
Under chapter 38, article 3, section 6 of the West Virginia Code, the precise

114

Herring v. Carroll, 300 S.E.2d 629, 634 (W. Va. 1983).

115

W. VA. CODE § 38-3-6 (1985) (lien ofjudgment on real estate). This section provides that:
Every judgment for money rendered in this State, other than by
confession in vacation, shall be a lien on all the real estate of or to which the
defendant in such judgment is or becomes possessed or entitled, at or after the date
of such judgment, or if it was rendered in court, at or after the commencement of
the term at which it was so rendered, if the cause was in such condition that a
judgment might have been rendered on the first day of the term; but if from the
nature of the case judgment could not have been rendered at the commencement
of the term, such judgment shall be a lien only on or after the date on which such
judgment or decree could have been rendered and not from the commencement of
the term; but this section shall not prevent the lien of a judgment or decrees from
relating back to the first day of the term merely because the case shall be set for
trial or hearing on a later day of the term, if such case was matured and ready for
hearing at the commencement of the term, not merely because an office judgment
in a case matured and docketed at the commencement of the term does not become
final until a later day of the term. A judgment by confession in vacation shall also
be a lien upon such real estate, but only from the time of day at which such
judgment is confessed. Such lien shall continue so long as such judgment remains
valid and enforceable, and has not been released or otherwise discharged.

Id.
116

W. VA.

CODE

§ 44-8-3 (1997) (real estate to be assets for payment of debts). This section

provides that:
All real estate of any person who may hereafter die, as to which he may
die intestate, or which, though he die testate, shall not by his will be charged with
or devised subject to the payment of his debts, or which may remain after
satisfying the debts with which it may be so charged, or subject to which it may
be so devised, shall be assets for the payment of the decedent's debts and all
lawful demands against his estate, in the order in which the personal estate of a
decedent is directed to be applied.
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status of the "creditor" is important. Black's Law Dictionarydefines a "general
creditor" as "[a] creditor at large (supra), or one who has no lien or security for the
payment of his debt or claim," and a "creditor at large" as "[o]ne who has not
established his debt by the recovery of a judgment or has not otherwise secured a
lien on any of the debtor's property." ' 7 Black's Law Dictionary further defines a
"lien creditor" as "[o]ne whose debt or claim is secured by a lien on particular
property, as distinguished from a 'general' creditor, who has no such security. A
creditor who has acquired a lien on the property involved, by attachment, levy or
the like ... .""8 The courts in West Virginia, recognizing the distinction between
"general creditors" and "lien creditors," have stated that "[t]he creditors protected
by that statute [chapter 74, section 5 of the West Virginia Code]" 9 are lien creditors,
having right to charge the property directly by execution, attachment, or otherwise,
not holders of mere personal demands or claims."'2 0 In other words, for a general
creditor to become a lien creditor, the "debt" must be "reduced" to judgment and
once a judgment has been entered, "[e]very judgment for money rendered in this
State... shall be a lien on all the real estate of or to which the defendant in such
judgment is or becomes possessed or entitled, at or after the date of such
judgment."'' As discussed supra,the docketing of a judgment is not sufficient to
sever the survivorship feature of a joint tenancy."n Therefore, under the common

117 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 368 (6th ed. 1990).
118 Id. at 923.
119 Under West Virginia statutory law:

Every such contract, every deed conveying any such estate or term, and
every deed of gift, or trust deed or mortgage, conveying real estate shall be void
as to creditors and subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration without
notice, until and except from the time that it is duly admitted to record in the
county wherein the property embraced in such contract, deed, trust deed or
mortgage may be.
W. VA. CODE ch. 74, § 3103 (1906) (currently W. VA. CODE § 40-1-9 (1982)) (corresponding to W.
VA. CODE ch. 74, § 5 (1899)).
120 Birch River Boom & Lumber Co. v. Glendon Boom & Lumber Co., 76 S.E. 972, 974 (W. Va.

1912); see also Moore v. Tearney, 57 S.E. 263 (W. Va. 1907).
W. VA. CODE § 38-3-6 (1985). Note that the docketing of an abstract of judgment pursuant to
chapter 38, article 3, section 5 of the West Virginia Code is necessary for the lien to be valid against
a purchaser of real estate for valuable consideration without notice. W. VA. CODE § 38-3-7 (1985).
121

122

See supratext accompanying notes 27-28, 98.
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law, if the judgment is against the first joint tenant to die, the deceased joint
tenant's interest in the land "ceased" upon his death so that the surviving joint
tenant owns the real estate free of the lien acquired by the judgment creditor against
the deceased joint tenant." Obviously, if the lien is against the surviving joint
tenant, then the surviving joint tenant has an inheritable interest to which the lien
could attach.'24 Although the courts in West Virginia have not considered a
"creditor" of a deceased joint tenant's right to the land owned as a joint tenant, our
courts have recognized that, outside of the recording acts, judgment creditors cannot
have greater rights than the judgment debtor."z In Snyder v. Botkin, 2 a the court
considered whether a judgment was a lien against land which was being sold under
a parol contract, which had been sufficiently performed to enable the purchaser to
compel the vendor to execute the parol contract in equity.'27 The court protected
the purchaser under the oral contact by holding the land was not subject to a lien
created by ajudgment against the vendor.'" The court's holding is expressed in the
syllabus, which states that:
Where statute enactments do not interfere, a judgment
creditor can acquire no better right to the estate of the debtor than
the debtor himself has when the judgment is recovered. He takes
it subject to every liability under which the debtor held it, and
subject to all the equities which exist in favor of third parties; and
a court of equity will limit the lien of the judgment to the actual

123 See supra notes 27-28.
124 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 6.1. Commentators explain that:
When the first joint tenant dies, his individual right to share possession and
enjoyment ceases. His heirs or devisees take nothing because the individual
cotenant has no estate of inheritance to pass on to them. The deceased tenant's
estate is extinguished on his death; the estate continues in the survivor or
survivors. The last survivor, of course, owns the whole estate in severalty because
he no longer shares the estate with his former cotenants.
Id.
125 Snyder v. Botkin, 16 S.E. 591 (W. Va. 1892).
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
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129
interest which the debtor has in the estate.

To the extent that Snyder and its progeny provide guidance, they are consistent with
the common law and negate an argument that chapter 38, article 3, section 6 of the
West Virginia Code constitutes a statutory change of the common law on the issue
discussed herein.
VII. WHAT REAL ESTATE OF DECEDENTS IS
AN ASSET FOR PAYMENT OF DEBTS

As with chapter 38, article 3, section 6 of the West Virginia Code, without
a case directly on point, one must look at the statute itself and the court decisions
relating to the statute and try to glean some guidance as to how chapter 44, article
8, section 3 of the West Virginia Code may be applied to property which "passes"
to a cotenant pursuant to joint tenancy. In understanding a statute, it is frequently
helpful to understand the law prior to the enactment of the statute. Minor explains
the background of this statute as follows:
By the feudal law land held by feudal tenure was not
subject to the debts of the owner, lest the debtor tenant be
substituted, without the lord's consent, by one inimical to the
lord's interests, and the feudal rule requiring the lord's consent to
an alienation by the tenant be thus evaded and abrogated.
In process of time, however, the lands of a deceasedowner
became liable to his debts of recordand to his debts of specialty
(that is, under seal) expressly binding the heirs, provided the lands
had descended upon the heir and had remained in his hands until
suit was brought to enforce the debt.
By statute 13 Edw. I, c. 18, lands of a living debtor were
allowed to be subjected upon a judgment against him under a "writ
of elegit." This statute enacted that "he who recovereth in debt or
damages, may have either a fieri facias of the chattels of the
debtor, or a writ on which the sheriff shall deliver to him all the
chattels of the debtor, saving only his oxen and beasts of the plow,
and half of his land until the debt be levied upon a reasonable price
or extent." Formerly the land taken under this writ was not sold
but merely retained by the creditor until the rents and profits were
sufficient to pay the judgment. Now, in England, an order of sale

129

Id. at 591, Syl. Pt. 3; see also Westinghouse Lamp Co. v. Ingram, 90 S.E. 837, Syl. Pt. 3 (W. Va.

1916).
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may be had for the debtor's land and the proceeds distributed
among all of his creditors.
While, as already mentioned, lands of a deceased owner
could at common law be subjected only to recorddebts or debts of
specialty expressly binding the heirs, and to none others, it is
enacted in Virginia that "all real estate of any person who may
hereafter die, as to which he may die intestate, or which, though he
die testate, shall not by his will be chargedwith or devised subject
to the payment of his debts, or which any remain after satisfying
such debts, shall be assets for the payment of the decedent's debts
and all lawful demands against his estate in the order in which
personal estate is directed to be applied;" [sic] and that such assets
may be administered by a court of equity.
In Virginia therefore, it will be seen, lands in the hands of
the devisees or heirs are in general made liable in equity for all the
debts of the deceased owner, but the heirs or devisees are not
personally liable therefor further than to the extent of the value of
the land to which they succeed. But they are responsible to that
extent, even though they alienate the land in the meantime. In the
latter event, however, the purchaserfrom the heir or devisee, if the
conveyance be bona fide and before suit is brought by the
decedent's creditors to administer the assets, or before a report of
debts is filed by the personal representative of the decedent, is not
responsible, either in rem or inpersonam,unless he has purchased
within one year after the decedent's death. When such purchaser
is liable to the decedent's creditors at all, he is liable to the extent
of the value of the land so purchased, but no further. 30
Therefore, in view of the background of the statute and by giving its words
their "plain meaning," there would not appear to be any "legislative intent" for the
statute to change the definition of a decedent's "assets."'' There is also nothing in
the statute or its background which indicates it was intended to "impliedly" alter
traditional property rights."' Support for this assumption is found in Gilkison v.

130 1 RIBBLE, supra note 13, § 161 (footnotes omitted).
131

IdL

132 Id.
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Gore' which, for present purposes, is perhaps the most helpful decision 34relating
to this statute. In Gilkison, a husband and wife purchased land "jointly."'
The grantor retained a "vendor's lien" in the deed for the balance of the
purchase price which was represented by a note signed by both husband and wife.'35
The husband and wife had also borrowed the "down payment" made to the grantor
and had given a note secured by a deed of trust to secure the loan for the "down
payment."'36 The wife died "leaving" these lien debts as well as other joint and
individual debts.'3 7 The specific question before the court relates to husband's
curtesy rights which the court held attached only to the equity of redemption (i.e.,
the land subject to the lien debts). 3
The court's holding on the husband curtesy is reflected in the syllabus,
which states that "[iun this State the curtesy of the husband in his wife's land is not
subject to her general debts, but to the lien debts thereon only, existing thereon
when his curtesy becomes consummate by her death."'39 As to the unsecured debts,
the lower court had "charged" the wife's moiety with the payment of her share of
these debts. 4 On appeal, the court said that "[b]ut as to the general and unsecured

133 91 S.E. 395 (W. Va. 1917).
134

Id. at 395. While the court used the term "jointly" in the decision, the substance of the discussion

indicates the property was owned as tenants in common. Id. For example, the court stated that:
What a wife dies seized of, where the facts are as assumed, and as in the case at bar, is an
estate in the equity of redemption. This is the only estate she leaves, and it is the estate of
inheritance which descends to her heirs, subject to the estate by the curtesy of the husband,
given by the statute.
Id. Obviously, if it were a joint tenancy, the first joint tenant to die does not have an inheritable
interest to descend to her heirs. Her husband, as the surviving joint tenant, would be the "sole" owner.
135

Id.

136

Gilkison, 91 S.E. at 395.

137 Id.
138 See supra note 65. A statutory form of curtesy existed in West Virginia until the general revision
of the state code in 1931 when curtesy was abolished and the husband was given "dower" rights equal
to the wife. For a discussion of curtesy in West Virginia prior to its abolition, see Note, Tenant By
Curtesy-Acts 1921 - Construction, 29 W. VA. L.Q. & B.199 (photo. reprint 1963) (1922-1923).
139 Gilkison, 91 S.E. at 395, Syl. Pt. 3.
140

Id. at 396.
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debts we think the court below was in error..... Counsel argued the correctness of
the lower court's decision relying upon the married woman's acts and "section 3,
Chapter 86, making real estate of any person dying intestate, etc., assets for the
payment of his debts"; 42 the wording of our curtesy statute; 4 3 and a Nebraska
case. ' The court rejected counsel's argument stating:
The Nebraska case involved the construction of a statute which
gave to the husband an estate by the curtesy in his wife's lands
subject to her debts, and the cases cited in the opinion, and in the
note supporting the principal case, involved the same or similar
statutes. Our statute does not in specific terms subject the curtesy
of the husband to the payment of her debts. True, a wife may by
her contracts, under the statute, subject her property to the payment
of her debts, and the same, and the rents, issues and profits thereof
during her life time, may be sold by decree for the payment
thereof; and by deeds or contracts, her husband joining therein, she
may encumber her real estate, and render such liens at the time of
her death superior to his curtesy. But we can find no warrant in
any statute for subjecting his curtesy, consummate on her death, to
her general debts. We think the effect of our statute, section 15, of
said chapter 65, was to abolish tenancy by the curtesy initiate, but
as to tenancy by the curtesy consummate, the husband takes such
estate on the death of the wife free from all, except specific liens
then existing thereon. It is only in those states like Nebraska,
where the statute specifically renders the curtesy of the husband

141 Id.
142 Id. The pertinent section of the code provides:

All real estate of any person who may hereafter die, as to which he may
die intestate, or which, though he die testate, shall not by his will be charged with

or devised subject to the payment of his debts, or which may remain after
satisfying the debts with which it may be so charged, or subject to which it may
be so devised, shall be assets for the payment of the decedent's debts and all
lawful demands against his estate, in the order in which the personal estate of a
decedent is directed to be applied.
W. VA. CODE ch. 86, § 4017 (1913) (currently W. VA. CODE § 44-8-3 (1997)) (corresponding to W.
VA. CODE ch. 86, § 3 (1899)).
143 Gilkison, 91 S.E. at 395.

144 Id. at 396; see Miller v. Hanna, 131 N.W. 226 (Neb. 1911).
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subject to the wife's debts, that the contrary rule has been
established."'
The significance of the Gilkison decision is that it recognized that chapter
44, article 8, section 3 of the West Virginia Code did not create rights in general
creditors of a deceased cotenant's land greater than the deceased spouse's curtesy
rights. Since the case involved an inheritable interest of the deceased spouse, it
does not raise the same issue as joint tenancy, but the case does establish that the
code section does not supersede a traditional property interest.
In addition, when chapter 44, article 8, section 3 of the West Virginia Code
is construed along with sections 5146 and 6,147 as the McConaughey court says it
should, 48 then the decedent's property made an asset for the payment of debts is the
property succeeded to by an "heir or devisee."' 49 Chapter 44, article 8, section 6 of
the West Virginia Code provides that "[a]n heir or devisee may be sued in equity
by any creditor to whom a debt is due, for which the estate descended or devised is
liable."' 50 In Roane County Bank v. Phillips,51 the court stated that chapter 44,
145 Gilkison, 91 S.E. at 396 (emphasis added).
146 The pertinent section provides:

Any heir or devisee who shall sell and convey any real estate, which by
this article is made assets, shall be liable to those entitled to be paid out of such
assets, for the value thereof, with interest; in such case the estate conveyed shall
not be liable, if at the time of the conveyance the purchaser shall have no notice
of any fraudulent intent on the part of the grantor, and no suit shall have been
commenced for the administration of such assets, nor any report have been filed,
as aforesaid, of the debts and demands of those entitled.
W. VA. CODE ch. 86, § 5 (1899) (current version at W. VA. CODE § 44-8-5 (1997)).
147 The pertinent section states:

An heir or devisee may be sued in equity by any creditor to whom a debt
is due, for which the estate descended or devised is liable, or for which such heir
or devisee is liable in respect to such estate; and he shall not be liable to an action
at law for any matter for which there may be any redress by such suit in equity.
W. VA. CODE ch. 86, § 6 (1899) (current version at W. VA. CODE § 44-8-6 (1997)).
148 40 S.E. 540, 544 (W. Va. 1901).

149 See W. VA. CODE §§ 44-8-5 to -6 (1997).
150 W. VA. CODE § 44-8-6 (1997).
151 22 S.E.2d 291 (W. Va. 1942).
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article 8, section 3 of the West Virginia Code gives unsecured creditors a claim
upon the land of which the decedent died seised'52
The effect of chapter 44, article 8, section 3 of the West Virginia Code.53
on the common law was addressed by the court of claims in McFaddin v. United
States.5 4 In McFaddin,the Court of Claims was asked to decide whether, under the
subject to the payment of expenses of
laws of West Virginia, real estate is
55
estate.
decedent's
a
of
administration
The court begins its analysis by noting that "[a]t common law, the real
estate of the decedent is not subject to the payment of the expenses of the
administration of his estate,"'56 and unless the common law has been changed by
statute, then, under the constitution and statute of West Virginia, the common law
prevails. 57 The government conceded that there was no statute precisely on point,
but argued that chapter 44, article 8, section 3 of the West Virginia Code embodied
such a change.'58 After quoting the statute, the court disposes of the government's
argument by reasoning that:
The position of the defendant is that the phrase "all lawful
demands against his estate" includes administration expenses, and
therefore it must be said that real estate in West Virginia is subject
to the payment of such expenses. We cannot accede to this
proposition. Much of the West Virginia law is derived from

152 Id.; see also Trail v. Trail, 49 S.E. 431 (W. Va. 1904); Hull v. Hull's Heirs, 26 W. Va. 1 (1885).
153 For the language of the pertinent statute in effect in 1935, see supra note 96. The language of the

statute effective in 1935 is identical to the language in effect in 1913. Compare W. VA. CODE § 44-8-3
(1932) with W. VA. CODE ch. 86, § 4017 (1913) (currently codified at W. VA. CODE § 44-8-3 (1997))
(corresponds to W. VA. CODE ch. 86, § 3 (1899)).
154 10 F. Supp. 286 (Ct. Cl. 1935).
155 Id. at 286. Under the tax law at that time real estate was considered part of the gross estate "'[t]o

the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death which after his death is subject
to the payment of the charges against his estate and the expenses of its administration and is subject
to distribution as part of his estate."' Id. at 286 (quoting Revenue Act § 402(a), 42 Stat. 278 (1921)).
156 Id.
157 See supra note 113.
158 MeFaddin, 10 F. Supp. at 286.
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Virginia, from which it was separated in 1863, many of the
existing laws being adopted when it became a state. The section
in question is identical with a section of the Virginia statute now
appearing as section 5395, Code Va. 1930. An examination of the
development of the Virginia statutes shows that the provision
making real estate liable for "all lawful demands against his
[decedent's] estate" first appeared therein in connection with
certain revisions which were made in 1849. Code Va. 1849, c.
131, § 3. In making such addition, we find no reference to an
enlargement of the common-law rule to make real estate liable for
expenses which might be incurred by the decedent's personal
representative in the administration of his estate, but rather the
expressed purpose was to make such property liable for obligations
incurred by the decedent in his lifetime for which the personal
representative could be sued. Nor do we find any subsequent
expressed intent of a different nature, either in connection with
various related changes of the Virginia statute or in the adoption of
the present statute in West Virginia. A change of so marked nature
as contended for by defendant should not be spelled out of the
general language used when another and different purpose was
sought to be accomplished, unless the language used makes
necessary such an interpretation. We find no decision by the
Virginia or West Virginia courts directly in point, though various
cases on closely analogous questions tend to support the view that
the words "all lawful demands" do not refer to demands which the
personal representative might make against the real estate for the
payment of administration expenses.'59
VIII. Is THERE A GENERAL RULE?
As a general statement, absent a statute specifically addressing the issue,
other states have followed the common law rule as set forth above. For example,
Professor Paul G. Haskell explains that:
When a joint tenant dies, as we have said, his interest
moves to the survivor without an instrument of transfer or estate
administration. That interest which passes is not subject to the
claims of the deceased joint tenant's creditors. During that joint

159

Id. at 287.
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tenant's life his interest could be reached by his creditors, but at his
death his interest disappears, so there is nothing for the creditors
to reach. 6 0
The general rule is stated in American Jurisprudenceas follows:
An estate in joint tenancy is one held by two or more
persons jointly, with equal rights to share in its enjoyment during
their lives, and having as its distinguishing feature the right of
survivorship, by virtue of which the entire estate, upon the death of
ajoint tenant goes to the survivor, or, in the case of more than two
joint tenants, to the survivors, and so on to the last survivor, free
and exempt from all charges made by his deceased cotenant or
cotenants.161
Similarly Corpus Juris Secundum states that "[s]o, subject to the statutory
modification of the rule... on the death of a joint tenant the survivor or survivors
take the whole estate, free from the claims of the heirs or creditors of the deceased
cotenant."' 6
Because secondary sources are based upon the decisions in various
jurisdictions, it will be helpful to examine some of those decisions. One of the
earlier cases to discuss the issue was Musa v. Segelke & Kohihaus Co. 63 In Musa,
property was conveyed to a husband and wife, and the survivor of them in 1915."6
In 1928, Segelke & Kohlhaus Co. obtained a judgment against the husband, and it
was docketed on April 7, 1928.165 Mr. Musa, the husband, died in 1932, and no

160

PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO WILLS, TRUSTS AND ADMINISTRATION 117 (2d ed. 1994).

Professor Haskell also explains that creditors could reach the interest during the debtor joint tenant's
life by stating that "the creditors of a joint tenant can levy upon his interest, the purchaser at the
execution sale becoming a tenant in common with the other tenant." Id.
161 20 AM. JUR. 2D Cotenancyand Joint Ownership § 3 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
162 48A C.J.S. Joint Tenancy § 3 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
163 272 N.W. 657 (Wis. 1937).
164 Id.
165

Id.
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execution of the judgment was issued until 1936.166 Mrs. Musa brought suit to
remove the judgment as a cloud on title "and to enjoin the seizure and sale of any
interest in the land by virtue of the execution issued thereon."' 67 The court rejected6
the defendant's argument that a statute making ajudgment a lien against the land
and a separate statute which provided that one year after "the death of a judgment
debtor execution may be issued against any property upon which the judgment is
a lien and may be executed in the same manner and with the same effect as if he
were still living' '169 gave the creditors a right to execute against the land now owned
by the surviving tenant. 70 After noting that the mere entry of ajudgment did not
sever the survivorship and that the judgment creditor's lien is against the precise
interest or estate which the judgment debtor actually and effectively had in the land,
the court concluded:
[T]here was no effective severance of the joint tenancy interests in
question during Adam Musa's lifetime; that, consequently, all of
his right, title, and interest in the premises became extinguished
and ceased upon his death; and that thereupon the entire right, title,
and interest therein vested in the plaintiff by virtue of the deed
conveying the premises to her and Adam Musa in joint tenancy. 7 '
The Musa opinion gave rise to an annotation in American Law Reports.'72 While
the annotation has been updated by additional case citations, it has not been

166 Id.
167 Id.
168 West Virginia has a similar statutory provision. See W. VA. CODE

§ 38-3-6 (1985).

169 Musa, 272 N.W. at 657-58.
170 Id. at 658.
171 Id. at 659.
172 Annotation, Rights and Remedies of Judgment Creditor or of PurchaserUnder Execution, in

Respect of Estate in Real PropertyHeld in Joint Tenancy, II1 A.L.R. 171 (1937).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol99/iss4/4

36

Fisher: Creditors of a Joint Tenant: Is There a Lien after Death

19971

CREDITORS OF A JOINT TENANT

superseded.'73
Another of the "early" cases on this issue is the California decision of
Ziegler v. Bonnell. While California is a community property 75state, it still has
joint tenancy with the same attributes as the common law estate.
After quoting from American Law Reports annotation cited supra, the
California court agreed with the reasoning of the Musa decision that since the
judgment debtor's interest in the land ended with his death, so did the lien. 76 The
court said:
This rule is sound in theory and fair in its operation. When
a creditor has a judgment lien against the interest of one joint
tenant he can immediately execute and sell the interest of his
judgment debtor, and thus sever the joint tenancy, or he can keep
his lien alive and wait until the joint tenancy is terminated by the
death of one of the joint tenants. If the judgment debtor survives,
the judgment lien immediately attaches to the entire property. If
the judgment debtor is the first to die, the lien is lost. If the
creditor sits back to await this contingency, as respondent did in
this case, he assumes the risk of losing his lien.'77

173

The author, after noting that the question addressed in the annotation had not arisen very

frequently, stated that:
According to the authorities cited in the annotation, it may be stated that
in general, where land is held by joint tenants, one of whom is ajudgment debtor,
the mere docketing of the judgment does not effect a severance of the joint estate,
and if the debtor dies before levy of execution, the judgment creditor loses his
rights against the debtor's interest, all of which passes to the surviving joint
tenant; that, however, the estate of ajoint tenant is subject to execution, and a levy
thereof effects a severance of the joint estate, and after such a levy and sale, the
purchaser and the surviving joint tenant hold the property as tenants in common.
Id. at 172.
174

126 P.2d 118 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942).

Id at 119. The California District Court of Appeals explained that "[t]he right of survivorship is
the chief characteristic that distinguishes ajoint tenancy from other interests in property. The surviving
joint tenant does not secure that right from the deceased joint tenant, but from the devise or conveyance
by which the joint tenancy was first created." Id.
175

176 Id. at

120-21.

177 Id.
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In 1953, the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided this question in Eder
v. Rothamel.'78 In Eder, the court stated the issue simply: "Is a joint tenancy
severed by the lien of ajudgment against one of the joint tenants? If it is, the lien
continues to embrace the interest of that joint tenant after his death. If it is not, that
interest passes unencumbered to the surviving joint tenants."' 7
The Maryland court followed the Musa and Ziegler decisions in holding
that upon the death of the judgment debtor, the surviving joint tenant or tenants take
free of the judgment lien. 8 °
In view of the general acceptance of the general rule, parties have advanced
several arguments in an attempt to judicially alter the rule. For example, in
8 the court rejected
Schlichenmayer v. Luithle"'
an argument of unjust enrichment.' 2
In Schlichenmayer, the plaintiff sought to hold the surviving wife liable for her
deceased husband's debts." 3 The plaintiff advanced several arguments for holding
178

95 A.2d 860 (Md. 1953).

179

Id. at 861.

180

Id. at 862. As part of its decision, the Eder court states:
The point at which an involuntary conveyance reduces the interest of
one of the joint tenants to the point of severance and destruction of the joint
tenancy, varies with different jurisdictions. In some, this occurs when there is a
levy on ajudgment. Generally, this is where under a levy there is a seizure of real
estate and the holding is that this seizure interferes with possession of the joint
tenants so as to cause the destruction of the unity of possession and the consequent
severance of ajoint estate. In other jurisdictions where the levy does not deprive
the tenant of the use of his property, it is held that there is no interference with any
of the unities, and consequently, no severance of the joint tenancy. See Van
Antwerp v. Horan, 390 IIl. 449, 61 N.E.2d 358, 161 A.L.R. 1133; and annotation
in 161 A.L.R. 1139. There is complete agreement, however, in all jurisdictions
that (a) the levy and completed sale in execution does sever the joint tenancy, and
(b) the mere obtention or docketing of a judgment lien does not operate to sever
the joint tenancy. We have been referred to no case in the United States or
England, nor have we found any, which holds otherwise. In every reported case,
it has been held that ajudgment lien, without levy or execution on the judgment,
does not sever ajoint tenancy or prevent the interest of the judgment debtor from
passing to or ripening in the surviving co-tenants, free of lien.

Id.
181

221 N.W.2d 77 (N.D. 1974).

182

Id.

183

Id.
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the wife liable for her interest in the property the wife owned as the surviving joint
tenant.' u The only argument relevant for present purposes was unjust enrichment.
In response to this assertion, the court explained:
We do not believe that the principle of unjust enrichment
applies here. Mrs. Luithle was the joint tenant in real property
acquired many years earlier by her husband and herself. Mrs.
Luithle obtained her interest in the joint-tenancy real estate not
from her husband's estate but by reason of the original jointtenancy deed. Joint tenancy is not an estate of inheritance; a joint
tenant who dies leaving a surviving tenant has no interest which he
may devise. The creditors of the decedent might have levied upon
the decedent's interest in the real estate during his lifetime, but
upon his death the title passed to the cotenant free of all claims of
creditors, and subject only to payment of estate taxes.
The doctrine of unjust enrichment applies only when a
person has and retains money or benefits which in justice and
equity belong to another. We find no basis for invoking the
doctrine here, since the defendant's right to the property upon the
death of her husband antedated by many years the acts of the
husband which are claimed to have resulted in the unjust
enrichment of the wife.
Mrs. Luithle was absolutely entitled to the joint-tenancy
property upon the death of her husband, regardless of whether his
estate was solvent or insolvent. There could scarcely be an
"unjust" enrichment in her accepting what the law grants without
185
any obligation to make restitution or payment.
One of the more recent discussions of the question is in Rembe v. Stewart.86
The Iowa court begins its decision in Rembe by stating that "[t]his appeal invites
us, on public policy grounds, to change a longstanding rule concerning property
held in joint tenancy. We decline in the belief that any such change should be by

184

Id.

185

Id. at 82-83 (citations omitted).

186

387 N.W.2d 313 (Iowa 1986).
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statute."' 7 The longstanding rule the court was asked to change was "[t]he general
rule that a surviving joint tenant takes real property free of the debts of the deceased
joint tenant."' 8 8 The change the plaintiff urged the court to adopt was that "when
probate assets are insufficient to pay claims made against an estate, property held
by a surviving joint tenant should be made available to satisfy them."'89 The court,
attending that the plaintiff's facts did not present a particularly strong case for
change, 9 ' rejected the plaintiffs arguments as follows:
Whatever the merits of the proposed change, we fear that,
if it were to occur by judicial fiat, the cure might be worse than the
disease. Joint tenancies are already fraught with dangerous and
often expensive problems and to add to them might not be worth
any advantages gained by the change. Experience has clearly
taught that even the most careful estate plan is subject to shipwreck
upon the treacherous reef of a stray joint tenancy deed. Joint
tenancies have multiplied countless problems relating to death
taxes in the estates of the unwary. It may be that the policies
mentioned would justify the proposed change. But the additional
litigation necessary to sort through claims such as this one, and in
settling the real estate titles that might be compromised also have
to be weighed in the balance.
We think the weighing of these and other conflicting
considerations is more appropriate for the legislative than for the
judicial process. We decline to change our rule. 9 '
IX. CONCLUSION
As noted supra,the law in West Virginia has established that a judgment
entered pursuant to chapter 38, article 3, section 6 of the West Virginia Code and

187

Id. at313.

188

Id.

189

Id.at314.

The plaintiff had served as conservator of the plaintiff for many years prior to her death and was
executor of her estate. Id The court noted there was no claim of fraud and that as the deceased joint
tenant's conservator, plaintiff was in no position to contend she contributed her services in ignorance
of deceased joint tenant's property interest. Rembe, 387 N.W.2d at 315.
190

191 Id. at315.
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docketed pursuant to chapter 38, article 3, section 5 of the West Virginia Code does
not sever the survivorship between joint tenants, 92 and it is the generally accepted
rule that the lien against the property ceases when a judgment debtor dies survived
by a joint tenant(s).
Given the fact that the court decisions in our state have
essentially followed the common rules relevant to joint tenancy, 4 it is anticipated
that the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia will continue to adhere to those
principles in holding that a lien against a joint tenant judgment debtor's land will
cease upon the judgment debtor's death survived by a joint tenant. If this
assumption is correct, the question then becomes whether the court would consider
chapter 44, article 8, section 3 of the West Virginia Code 95 as sufficient to change
the common law. As noted supra,such statutes were not specifically designed to
address the issue ofjoint tenancy. 96 Therefore, if such a statute is to be applied to
joint tenancy, it would have to be by inference. However, when the government
argued in the McFaddin case that chapter 44, article 8, section 3 of the West
Virginia Code could be construed broadly to make real estate subject to the
expenses of the administration of a decedent's estate, the court rejected the
argument, stating that "[a] change of so marked nature as contended for by
defendant should not be spelled out of the general language used when another and
different purpose was sought to be accomplished, unless the language used makes
necessary such an interpretation."' 97
It is, therefore, submitted that until the legislature specifically addresses this
question, it should be assumed the common law principles still apply, that a
creditor's rights against a joint tenant rise no higher than the joint tenant's rights
and interest, and that when a joint tenant dies survived by a joint tenant, his/her
rights in the estate cease to exist along with any claim a creditor has to such estate.

192

See supra note 98 and accompanying text.

193 See supra part VIII.
194

See supra note 93.

195 See supra part VII; see supra note 116.
196

See supra note 130.

197 McFadden v. United States, 10 F. Supp. 286, 287 (Ct. CI. 1935).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1997

41

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 99, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 4

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol99/iss4/4

42

